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Social inﬂuencea b s t r a c t
Modern research on social norms makes an important distinction between descriptive norms (how peo-
ple commonly behave) and injunctive norms (what one is morally obligated to do). Here we propose that
this distinction is far from clear in the cognition of social norms. In a ﬁrst study, using the implicit asso-
ciation test, the concepts of ‘‘common’’ and ‘‘moral’’ were found to be strongly associated. Some implica-
tions of this automatic common–moral association were investigated in a subsequent series of
experiments: Our participants tended to make explicit inferences from descriptive norms to injunctive
norms and vice versa; they tended to mix up descriptive and injunctive concepts in recall tasks; and fre-
quency information inﬂuenced participants’ own moral judgments. We conclude by discussing how the
common–moral association could play a role in the dynamics of social norms.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
Social norms and their power to govern behavior have been
studied extensively in the social sciences. There are several differ-
ent theoretical approaches to social norms, such as the focus the-
ory of Cialdini and colleagues (e.g., Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno,
1991), the social norms approach of Berkowitz and Perkins (e.g.,
Berkowitz, 2004), and Bicchieri’s theory of dynamics of norms in
social dilemmas (e.g., Bicchieri, 2006). These different approaches
share a theoretical division of social norms into two distinct types:
injunctive norms, referring to people’s beliefs about how one ought
to behave, and descriptive norms, referring to people’s beliefs about
what most people actually do. For a review of various lines of work
based on these concepts, see Lapinski and Rimal (2005).
In this paper we are concerned with the relation between
injunctive and descriptive norms. The two types of norms are often
congruent, by which we shall mean that what is common to do is
also what you ought to do. For instance, at a formal meeting the
descriptive norm is that most individuals will be silent andattentive. This norm is also injunctive, as noncompliance is likely
to incur social sanctions (example from Lapinski & Rimal, 2005,
p. 131). Several studies have found that injunctive and descriptive
norms tend to be congruent (e.g., Brauer & Chaurand, 2010;
Thøgersen, 2008). This statistical correlation is not a logical neces-
sity, though. People are quite capable of endorsing the moral desir-
ability of a certain behavior, yet not practice it (Cialdini, Reno, &
Kallgren, 1990). Thus, the concepts of descriptive and injunctive
norms are logically distinct, echoing David Hume’s famous law that
one cannot derive what ought to be from what is.
The reason for Hume to state this law was that he saw other
writers violating it, that is, they made claims about what ought
to be on the basis of what is. An intriguing question is why this fal-
lacy is so common. Can it be that the distinction between the
descriptive and the injunctive is not very clear in people’s minds?
Speciﬁcally, can it be that commonness and morality are automat-
ically associated with each other? This fundamental question
about cognition of social norms seems not to have been asked
before. However, it is related to a (rather loose) proposal of
Kelley (1971) according to which people depend on others’ behav-
ior as the evidence of what is right and wrong and therefore ‘‘con-
cepts of what ‘ought to be’ tend to drift toward conceptions of what
‘is’’’ (Kelley, 1971, p. 298).ior and
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The possibility of a cognitive link between the descriptive and
the injunctive is supported by a number of observations. First, as
Hume noted, his contemporaries were in the habit of blurring
the distinction. It is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd modern examples of such
blurring too. For instance, parents raising children may inter-
changeably use expressions like the injunctive ‘‘you shouldn’t do
that’’ and the descriptive ‘‘we don’t do that’’ (Boyer, 2012).
Lapinski and Rimal (2005, p. 130) note that even researchers of
norms sometimes conﬂate the distinction between injunctive and
descriptive norms.
Moreover, a large body of research has established a general
tendency of people to conform not only to injunctive norms but
also to descriptive norms (e.g., Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Borsari &
Carey, 2001; Borsari & Carey, 2003; Cialdini, 2003; Cialdini &
Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991; Claidière & Whiten,
2012; Perkins & Berkowitz, 1986). This similarity in the effects of
injunctive and descriptive norms is consistent with a mental asso-
ciation such that both kinds of norms activate the same behavioral
schemas.
The strongest evidence suggestive of a common–moral associa-
tion comes from studies ﬁnding that moral judgments of socially
undesirable behavior tend to be less harsh when the behavior is
perceived to be common (McGraw, 1985; Traﬁmow, Reeder, &
Blising, 2001; Welch et al., 2005), and that people seem to ﬁnd
fault both with singular selﬁshness and singular generosity in oth-
ers (Parks & Stone, 2010).
In sum, several empirical observations suggest that people’s
ideas about the morality of a behavior are linked to their beliefs
about how common it is. We shall now argue that it is plausible
that this association is automatic.
The common–moral association hypothesis
There is a large literature on the formation of automatic associa-
tions.Whilemuch of this literature focuses on the formation of eval-
uative associations (i.e., attitudes), most theoretical assumptions
are equally applicable to non-evaluative domains (Gawronski &
Sritharan, 2010). It is well-established that automatic associations
can come about through classical conditioning, that is, repeated
co-occurrence of stimuli (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Olson
& Fazio, 2001). Thus, the typical co-occurrence between injunctive
norms and descriptive norms – when it is salient what one ought
to do, most people will also be seen doing it – should tend to make
people form a correspondingmental association. Hence, both obser-
vations and theory support the hypothesis that commonness and
morality tend to be automatically associatedwith each other in peo-
ple’s minds. In Study 1 we test this hypothesis using the most well-
established method for measuring automatic associations, the
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998).
Note that the concept of morality is in itself multi-faceted. For
instance, it encompasses bothmoral obligation andmoral character
(Kelley, 1971; McGraw, 1985). However, the conceptual difference
between these aspects of morality seems very subtle compared to
the conceptual difference between commonness andmorality. Con-
sequently, the hypothesized automatic association with common-
ness is expected to apply across the different facets of morality.
Below we describe several implications of the common–moral
hypothesis, which we then test in a series of experimental studies.
In order to cover the injunctive-moral spectrum from obligation to
goodness, these studies used a variety of terms (obligated/up to
you, OK/not OK, moral/immoral, etc.). Studies also varied the set
of behavioral stimuli that these terms applied to, in order to cover
both the prescriptive domain of socially desirable behaviors and thePlease cite this article in press as: Eriksson, K., et al. Bidirectional association
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Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Stimuli also covered a range of
base rates and drew upon a range of different moral foundations
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).
Implication 1: explicit inferences between commonness and morality
Automatic associations have interesting downstream effects on
cognition and behavior (see, for instance, the introductory para-
graph of Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010). To begin with – unsurpris-
ingly but importantly – automatic associations inﬂuence people’s
explicit, verbally reported evaluations. The most comprehensive
model of the relationship between explicit evaluations and implicit
measures of associations is the APE model of Gawronski and
Bodenhausen (2006, 2011). According to the APE model, agree-
ment between explicit and implicit measures is expected as long
as the association, when made explicit as a verbal proposition, is
not inconsistent with other relevant beliefs (Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2011, p. 63). For instance, consider a question like:
‘‘To do X is common in group G; what do you think is the moral sta-
tus of doing X?’’ The automatic association of our hypothesis will
suggest that X is a moral thing to do. According to the APE model,
the cognitive process then proceeds with this suggestion being
weighed against other beliefs the respondent may have about the
appropriateness to verbalize that X is a moral thing to do. To the
extent that no strong contrary beliefs exist, the respondent should
then verbalize the moral status that is congruent with the fre-
quency information.
In other words, the common–moral association hypothesis
implies that explicit inferences between commonness and morality
should tend to be congruent. We test this prediction in Study 2.
Implication 2: distortion of memory
Memory research has established that schema-based expectan-
cies can cause memory distortion (Schacter, 1999, p. 194). For
instance, Banaji and Bhaskar (2000) reported a study where partic-
ipants read a list of African American and European American and
were asked to identify names of criminals that had appeared in the
media. In fact, none of the names were names of criminals. African
American names were incorrectly recalled as those of criminals
almost twice as often as European American names.
Information about social norms tends to be particularly well
remembered according to a study by O’Gorman, Wilson, and
Miller (2008). However, their study did not distinguish between
injunctive and descriptive norms. We propose that an automatic
common–moral association may be a source of error in recall of
social norms. Reminiscent of the abovementioned effect for mem-
ory of names of criminals, we expect information about one type of
norm to interfere with the memory of previous information of the
other type (e.g., information that behavior X is common might
cause information that X is immoral to be incorrectly recalled as
X being moral). We test this prediction in Studies 3 and 4.
We also propose an even stronger type of recall error: The cog-
nitive conﬂation of descriptive and injunctive norms may be so
potent that information about one type of norm is misremembered
as the congruent norm of the other type (e.g., information that
behavior X is moral might be recalled as X being common). As far
we know, this kind of recall error across associated categories has
not been studied before. We test this prediction in Studies 5 and 6.
Implication 3: inﬂuence of frequency information on own moral
judgments
Moral judgments largely rely on automatic evaluations (Haidt,
2001). We should therefore expect the automatic common–morals between descriptive and injunctive norms. Organizational Behavior and
1
K. Eriksson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx 3association to lead to descriptive information actually inﬂuencing
people’s own moral judgments. Indeed, we have already mentioned
some studies that have found people tend to judge behaviors in the
proscriptive domain as less immoral when common (McGraw,
1985; Traﬁmow et al., 2001; Welch et al., 2005). In the prescriptive
domain, however, the prediction from the common–moral associ-
ation competes with a previous prediction from trait attribution
theory. Speciﬁcally, it has been suggested that uncommon behav-
iors should generally lead to more extreme attributions of traits
(Reeder & Brewer, 1979). Applying this suggestion to moral traits,
McGraw (1985) hypothesized that someone behaving in an
immoral and uncommon way should be judged as particularly
immoral, whereas someone behaving in a moral and uncommon
way should be judged as particularly moral. Note that the com-
mon–moral association hypothesis makes the same prediction in
the proscriptive domain but the opposite prediction in the pre-
scriptive domain.
McGraw (1985) ran two experiments, each of which tested the
prediction in both domains. In the proscriptive domain results
were as predicted. In the prescriptive domain, the ﬁrst experiment
found a tendency for a positive relation between perceived com-
monness and morality – contrary to McGraw’s hypothesis but in
line with the common–moral association hypothesis. Whereas
the ﬁrst experiment studied a single behavior, McGraw’s second
experiment used several behaviors of different degrees of com-
monness. More common behaviors showed a tendency for higher
moral attributions, again contrary to McGraw’s hypothesis and in
line with the common–moral association. However, the evidence
was far from conclusive. For one thing, neither of these tendencies
was statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the methodology of corre-
lating perceptions of commonness with moral judgments is subject
to the third variable problem (i.e., a causal relation cannot be
concluded).1
In two experiments (Studies 7 and 8) we assessed the inﬂuence
of information about descriptive norms on own moral judgments
in the prescriptive domain. We manipulated the information
between conditions to make it possible to draw conclusions about
causality.
Sampled populations and modes of data collection
The sampled population and mode of data collection varied
across our studies. Studies 1 and 3 were conducted in a laboratory
with Swedish undergraduates. The other studies were conducted
online with American participants recruited through the Amazon
Mechanical Turk (mturk.com). This is a convenient and reliable
data source for online behavioral studies (Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Participants
who had already taken part in a previous study in this project were
identiﬁed by their mturk user ID number and excluded. Thus, the
data presented in this paper are based on unique sets of partici-
pants for each online study.
Overview of studies
In sum, we present a series of eight studies. The ﬁrst study tests
the core hypothesis, the presence of an automatic common–moral
association. The remaining studies experimentally investigates
implications for norm cognition in terms of explicit inferences of
norms, false recall of norms, and inﬂuences on own moral
judgments.1 In addition, McGraw also reported a negative correlation between individually
perceived commonness and moral attributions in the second experiment. However, as
every individual rated several different behaviors it is unclear how this correlation
was calculated and if it has any meaningful interpretation.
Please cite this article in press as: Eriksson, K., et al. Bidirectional association
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Our core hypothesis is that the common–moral association is
automatic. To enable this conclusion an implicit measure must
be used. The Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) is
a widely used paradigm to measure the strength of the automatic
association between different concepts. It rests on the assumption
that it should be easier to make the same behavioral response to
concepts that are more strongly associated. A few studies have
used IAT to measure associations between morality and other con-
cepts, such as the association between moral and self (Perugini &
Leone, 2009). Here we are interested in the association between
concepts related to the moral status of behaviors and concepts
related to the commonness of behaviors.
In the IAT participants are asked to sort stimuli into categories.
In our study these are Moral, Immoral, Common, and Uncommon.
Sorting is done by pressing one of two keys. In initial practice
blocks of trials only two categories are used (e.g., the left key for
Moral and the right key for Immoral). During the main tasks, all
four categories are shown simultaneously (e.g., Moral and Uncom-
mon on the left key and Immoral and Uncommon on the right key).
The pairing of categories switches between blocks. Differences in
reaction time are used to estimate the relative strength of associa-
tions between categories (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005).
Our hypothesis is that moral status and commonness concepts
are associated, such that participants’ response latencies should be
shorter when the key for Immoral was also used for Uncommon
rather than for Common.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from a large pool of volunteers at
Stockholm University, at a compensation of 150 Swedish kronor.
103 participants (31% female, 3% unknown) with age ranging from
19 to 47 years (M = 27 years, SD = 7 years) took part in this study.
Materials, design and procedure
The study was conducted in the GameLab at Stockholm Univer-
sity, a laboratory where participants in separate cubicles take part
in computer based studies. The IAT was administered using the
Inquisit 4 software. During the IAT, participants used the E- and
I-keys to sort stimulus words either left or right. Stimuli were pre-
sented in the center of the computer screen and sorting categories
were shown in the upper left and right of the screen. In translation
from Swedish, the following categories and stimuli were used.2 The
target category was Immoral (represented by the stimuli ‘‘wrong’’,
‘‘not okay’’, ‘‘bad’’), which was contrasted with Moral (‘‘right’’,
‘‘okay’’, ‘‘good’’). The paired categories were Common (‘‘almost
everyone’’, ‘‘majority’’, ‘‘typical’’) and Uncommon (‘‘almost no-one’’,
‘‘minority’’, ‘‘untypical’’). Previous meta-analyses have shown as
few as two words to be sufﬁcient to represent a category in an IAT
(Nosek et al., 2005).
Presentation of stimuli followed a standard sequence of blocks
described in Table 1. The order of the sequence was counterbal-
anced such that for half the participants the pairing Immoral–
Uncommon preceded the pairing Immoral–Common.
Scoring
Scoring followed the D2 algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji,
2003). This means that latencies below 400 ms and above
10,000 ms were removed. Errors were implicitly penalized in terms2 The Swedish terms used were: Moralisk (rätt, okej, god), Omoralisk (fel, inte okej,
dålig), Vanlig (nästan alla, majoritet, typisk), Ovanlig (nästan ingen, minoritet, otypisk).
s between descriptive and injunctive norms. Organizational Behavior and
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requiring a correct response to be given. For each participant, the
difference between the mean latency of the two practice blocks
was divided by the standard deviation of latencies in these blocks
pooled together. The analogous ratio was also calculated for the
test blocks. The D score of a participant was then computed as
the average of these two ratios. This is the IAT effect size measure,
with a theoretical range between 2 and 2. Differences were com-
puted such that a positive D score indicates a positive association
between Immoral and Uncommon (i.e., faster responses when
Immoral used the same key as Uncommon rather than Common).
Results
D scores were positive for 102 out of 103 participants, indicat-
ing a near universal association between the categories Immoral
and Uncommon. The mean D score was 1.09 (SD = 0.36) with a
99.9% conﬁdence interval between 0.97 and 1.21. This is a very
large effect, at least as large as that found in studies of well-known
associations between gender and science or implicit race attitude
(Greenwald et al., 2003).
Discussion
The core assumption of the common–moral association hypoth-
esiswas supported:Using the implicit association testwe found evi-
dence for a strong automatic association between injunctive and
descriptive concepts, exhibited by almost every single participant.
Study 2
The ﬁrst study assessed implicit associations between descrip-
tive and injunctive norms. Our next aim was to investigate
whether the association is still present when people are explicitly
asked to make inferences between descriptive and injunctive
norms. We studied both the prescriptive and proscriptive domains.
Method
Participants
Two hundred participants (35% female) with age ranging from
18 to 74 years (M = 30 years, SD = 11 years) were recruited online
among American users of Mturk at a compensation of half a US
dollar.
Materials
Participants were asked to imagine that they traveled to a new
place where customs may be different from what they are used to.
The questionnaire introduced two behaviors called ‘‘phooshing’’
and ‘‘quining’’. Phooshing was described as a generic socially unde-
sirable behavior (‘‘other people might appreciate if you don’t do it’’),Table 1
Sequence of trial blocks in IAT.
Block Trials Function Left key response Right key response
1 20 Practice Immoral Moral
2 20 Practice Common Uncommon
3 20 Practice Immoral + Common Moral + Uncommon
4 40 Test Immoral + Common Moral + Uncommon
5 20 Practice Moral Immoral
6 20 Practice Moral + Common Immoral + Uncommon
7 40 Test Moral + Common Immoral + Uncommon
Note: For half the subjects, the positions of Blocks 1, 3, and 4 were switched with
those of Blocks 5, 6, and 7, respectively. The procedure in Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7 was to
alternate trials that presented a stimulus from the Moral/Immoral categories with
trials that presented a stimulus from the Common/Uncommon categories.
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behavior (‘‘other people might appreciate if you did it’’). Participants
were ﬁrst asked what would be most important for them to know
about the new place: the actual frequencies of behaviors or the
general opinions about what you ought or ought not to do. This
question served the purpose of emphasizing the conceptual differ-
ence between descriptive and injunctive norms.
We then presented participants with information about the
descriptive norms, i.e., the frequency of phooshing and quining in
this strange place. Given this information, participants were asked
for each behavior what they thought the injunctive normwould be.
For example, the exact wording (in one condition) of the question
about the undesirable behavior was: ‘‘Suppose you learn about
some new place that it is not common to phoosh. What is your
intuition on the general opinion about phooshing?’’ Participants
were then given a binary choice between ‘‘one ought not to pho-
osh’’ and ‘‘it is up to you whether you want to phoosh’’. The ques-
tion about the desirable behavior was similar, with a binary choice
between ‘‘one ought to quine’’ and ‘‘it is up to you whether you
want to quine’’.
Then followed similar questions where participants were
instead presented with injunctive norms for each behavior and
asked what they thought the descriptive norms would be. For
example, the exact wording (in one condition) of the question
about the undesirable behavior was: ‘‘Suppose you learn about
some new place that the general opinion about phooshing is that
you ought not to do it. What is your intuition about whether phoo-
shing is common in this new place?’’ Participants were then given
a binary choice between ‘‘it is common to phoosh’’ and ‘‘it is not
common to phoosh’’.
Across participants information was counterbalanced such that
different combinations of pieces of information occurred equally
often.3Results
Results were overwhelmingly in favor of a common–moral
association. The inference that you ought not to phoosh was much
more frequent when phooshing was presented as not common
(80%) rather than common (15%), v2(1,N = 199) = 80.82, p < .001,
odds ratio = 22.38. Similarly, the inference that you ought to quine
was much more frequent when quining was presented as common
(80%) rather than not common (33%), v2(1,N = 198) = 41.42,
p < .001, odds ratio = 7.90.
Similar results held for inferences from injunctive to descriptive
norms. Thus, it was much more frequent to infer that it is uncom-
mon to phoosh when phooshing was presented as something you
ought not to do (88%) rather than up to you (45%),
v2(1,N = 199) = 41.45, p < .001, odds ratio = 8.96. Similarly, it was
much more frequent to infer that it is common to quine when quin-
ing was presented as something you ought to do (93%) rather than
up to you (50%), v2(1,N = 199) = 45.37, p < .001, odds ratio = 13.29.Discussion
This simple study asked people to make inferences from
descriptive norms to injunctive norms and vice versa. A strong ten-
dency for a common–moral association was in evidence in these
explicit inferences. As expected, this tendency was found in both
inferential directions and across the prescriptive and proscriptive
domains.3 For instance, both ‘‘phooshing common’’ and ‘‘phooshing not common’’ occurred
equally often together with ‘‘quining common’’ and ‘‘quining not common’’, and
equally often together with ‘‘you ought not to phoosh’’ and ‘‘it is up to you to phoosh’’.
s between descriptive and injunctive norms. Organizational Behavior and
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In the same lab sessions in which Study 1 was run we also
tested the hypothesis of interference between descriptive and
injunctive information in recall. We presented injunctive infor-
mation for a set of behaviors, followed by descriptive information
for the same set of behaviors. The information was manipulated
such that injunctive and descriptive norms were randomized to
be either congruent or incongruent. Participants were then asked
what injunctive norm had been presented for each behavior. Our
hypothesis is that participants automatically associate the
descriptive information to injunctive norms and that this associ-
ation can interfere with the memory of the earlier injunctive
information. An incorrect response to an incongruent item (e.g.,
a behavior presented as ‘‘not OK’’ and ‘‘common’’ recalled as
‘‘OK’’) would be a congruent recall error, because it is consistent
with recall of the congruent associated norm instead of the pre-
sented norm. An incorrect response to a congruent item (e.g., a
behavior presented as ‘‘OK’’ and ‘‘common’’ recalled as ‘‘not
OK’’) would be an incongruent recall error. Our hypothesis pre-
dicts congruent recall errors to dominate over incongruent recall
errors.Method
Participants
This study used the same 103 participants as Study 1.Materials, design and procedure
We used a set of twelve behaviors adapted from Graham et al.
(2009) to draw on all moral foundations (harm, fairness, ingroup,
authority, and purity).4 The ﬁrst part of the survey presented
manipulated information about injunctive norms found in a sur-
vey in a foreign country. Each behavior was presented as being
either ‘‘OK’’ or ‘‘not OK’’ (randomized per item) in the foreign
group. For instance, one item read ‘‘To slap your child was typi-
cally judged as [OK/not OK] in the group. Do you agree with this
judgment?’’ The main purpose of the question about agreement
was to force participants to pay attention to the manipulated
information without disclosing that a recall task would be given
later in the study. However, responses to different items were also
used as an indication of the moral status of each behavior in our
sample.
The second part of the survey presented similarly manipulated
information about typical judgments of descriptive norms in the
foreign group, either ‘‘common’’ or ‘‘uncommon’’ (randomized
per item). Again, participants were asked whether they agreed
with this judgment.
The third part declared that we were interested in how well
participants could recall the moral judgments of the foreign group.
We asked for each behavior in turn if the typical judgment in the
foreign group had been ‘‘OK’’ or ‘‘not OK’’.
At subsequent debrieﬁng, no participant claimed to have sus-
pected that the information on typical judgments in a foreign
group was fabricated.4 In English translation, the items were: slap your child; not give money to beggars
in need; laugh at a politician having personal problems; cut in with a friend on a long
line for a concert; take more than half of some sweets you have purchased to share
with a friend; report to the boss that your closest colleague does a poor job; help a
friend cheat on a test; question the boss every time he has a bad idea; request of
children to follow family traditions; not follow the law when it clashes with your
moral persuasion; shake hands when you have a bad cold; have many sex partners in
the same year.
Please cite this article in press as: Eriksson, K., et al. Bidirectional association
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Judgments of stimuli
Across stimuli, the proportion of participants who judged a
behavior as OK ranged from 6% to 77% and the proportion who
judged a behavior as common ranged from 16% to 83%. Thus, stim-
uli covered behaviors of varying moral status and varying
commonness.Error in recall
For each participant we calculated the total rate of recall errors
(M = 0.21, SD = 0.18) as well as separate rates for congruent recall
errors (M = 0.29, SD = 0.28) and incongruent recall errors
(M = 0.12, SD = 0.19). The difference between these error rates
was statistically signiﬁcant, t(102) = 5.32, p < .001, d = 0.52, a med-
ium sized effect.Individual differences
Recall that the IAT (Study 1) was conducted in the same lab ses-
sions. We realized after the studies were conducted that it would
be interesting to analyze whether individual differences in
response latencies to congruent and incongruent pairings in the
IAT would predict corresponding recall errors. Unfortunately, par-
ticipants were not identiﬁable across the two studies because of
the different software used. However, through an analysis of time
stamps it was possible for the lab assistant to infer identities across
studies with reasonable (but not absolute) certainty for a subset of
62 participants. For this subsample we conducted a tentative
analysis.
As expected, there was a positive correlation (r = .31, p = .013)
between the mean response latency for incongruent pairings and
the rate of recall error for incongruent norm pairs. Similarly, there
was a positive correlation between the mean response latency for
congruent pairings and the recall error rate for congruent norm
pairs (r = .35, p = .005). To rule out that these results simply
reﬂected an overall correlation between response latencies and
recall errors, we also computed the partial correlation between
congruent response latencies and congruent recall error rates
while controlling for the incongruent measures, and vice versa.
Both correlations remained positive (partial rs > .26, ps < .05).Discussion
We found information about a behavior’s descriptive norm to
interfere with recall of information about the injunctive norm.
The rate of congruent recall errors was more than twice as high
as the rate of incongruent recall errors. This suggests that automat-
ically associated injunctive norms can supersede earlier injunctive
information in recall.
Further, our analysis of individual differences in recall errors for
congruent and incongruent items indicated that they were pre-
dicted by response latencies for corresponding pairings in the
implicit association task. Conclusions are limited by the uncer-
tainty in the identiﬁcation of participants across the two tasks,
but the result is consistent with our assumption that the same cog-
nitive association underlies both the observed pattern in response
latencies and the observed pattern in recall errors.Study 4
The previous study tested whether descriptive information
interferes with recall of injunctive information. In this study we
extended this test to include also the other direction, that is,
whether injunctive information interferes with recall of descriptives between descriptive and injunctive norms. Organizational Behavior and
1
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the prescriptive and proscriptive domain.Method
Participants
Participants were recruited online among US users of the Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk at a compensation of one US dollar. There
were 200 participants (55% female) with age ranging from 18 to
69 years (M = 33 years, SD = 12 years).Materials, design and procedure
As our set of stimuli, we used a set of sixteen behaviors taken
from the Moralism scale (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Of the 16
items, half were taken from the prescriptive domain and half from
the proscriptive domain.5 Participants were split into two condi-
tions, Injunctive Recall (N = 100) and Descriptive Recall (N = 100).
The Injunctive Recall condition replicated Study 3: For each
behavior participants were told that a certain moral judgment
had been typical in a foreign group (either OK or wrong for pro-
scriptive items; either obligated or up to you for prescriptive items),
and asked whether they agreed with this judgment. The injunctive
information was manipulated such that half of the participants
were told one judgment was typical (say, ‘OK’), and the other half
was told the opposite judgment was typical (say, ‘wrong’).6 Follow-
ing Study 3, participants were subsequently told that a certain fre-
quency estimate had been typical in the foreign group (either
common or uncommon),7 and asked whether they agreed with this
estimation. The descriptive information was manipulated such that
half of the participants were told the typical estimate was ‘common’
and the other half was told the typical estimate was ‘uncommon’.
Further, the descriptive and injunctive information was congruent
– e.g., ‘wrong’ and ‘uncommon’ – for half the items (eight items
out of sixteen, four in each domain), and incongruent for the other
half of the items. Finally, participants were asked to recall for each
item the typical moral judgment of the foreign group. Depending
on the domain of the item, the response options were either OK/
wrong or obligated/up to you.
So far we have described the Injunctive Recall condition. In the
Descriptive Recall condition, the ﬁrst and second parts above were
interchanged so that descriptive information was presented ﬁrst
and the ﬁnal part then asked for recall of this descriptive informa-
tion, with response options common/uncommon.
At the end of the survey, participants were informed of the
deception and the purpose of the study. This practice was followed
in all on-line studies involving deception.Results
Judgments of stimuli
For each behavior we calculated the proportion of participants
who judged it as common. Proportions ranged from 27% to 74%,
indicating that the set of stimuli included both common and
uncommon behaviors.5 An example of a prescriptive item: ‘‘Cory is in the supermarket, where he sees an
elderly woman having trouble carrying her groceries. He is in a hurry and knows he
could ignore her, but considers instead helping the elderly woman carry her
groceries.’’ An example of a proscriptive item: ‘‘Melanie and Scott have just bought a
house in a quiet, middle-class neighborhood. The homes are not fancy, but are modest
and well-kept. Melanie and Scott are considering ignoring the community and
painting their house bright orange with green trim.’’
6 For instance, one item read: ‘‘To paint one’s house bright orange with green trim
in this situation was generally considered [OK/wrong].’’
7 For instance, one item read: ‘‘To help the elderly woman with her groceries in this
situation was generally considered to be a [common/uncommon] behavior.
Please cite this article in press as: Eriksson, K., et al. Bidirectional association
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The total rate of error in recall was computed for each partici-
pant as the proportion of items recalled incorrectly. There was no
signiﬁcant difference in error rates between injunctive recall
(M = 0.27, SD = 0.16) and descriptive recall (M = 0.30, SD = 0.17),
t(198) = 1.30, p = .20. Pooling injunctive recall and descriptive
recall yielded a mean error rate of 0.29 (SD = 0.17). The rate of con-
gruent recall errors (M = 0.36, SD = 0.21) was higher than the rate
of incongruent recall errors (M = 0.22, SD = 0.19), t(199) = 8.79,
p < .001, d = 0.62, a medium effect size. Separating conditions
showed that the error rate difference was similar for injunctive
recall (M = 0.15, SD = 0.23) and descriptive recall (M = 0.13,
SD = 0.22), t(198) = 0.58, p = .56.
Discussion
In Study 3, using Swedish students in a lab, we found that
descriptive information interfered with the recall of injunctive
information. Here we replicated this ﬁnding in an online study
with American users of the Amazon Mechanical Turk, using
another set of stimulus behaviors. Thus, the ﬁnding seems robust
with respect to various methodological variations.
Further, this study extended the investigation to include also
interference of injunctive information on recall of descriptive infor-
mation. The effect was the same in both directions, indicating that
the association between injunctive and descriptive can interfere
with memory of both types of norms.Study 5
In Studies 3 and 4 we found that information about one type of
norm, injunctive or descriptive, could interfere with recall of ear-
lier information about the other norm type. A related prediction
is that when only one type of norm information is given for a
behavior, it may be misremembered as being about the other type.
For instance, a behavior presented as ‘‘uncommon’’ may be
recalled, incorrectly but congruently, as ‘‘wrong’’ and vice versa.
Socially undesirable behaviors were presented together with
manipulated information about norms in a strange land. Each
behavior was presented as either common, uncommon, OK orwrong.
Participants were later asked to recall the items on a multiple-
choice format. We predicted that participants would tend to mix
up ‘common’ with ‘OK’, and ‘uncommon’ with ‘wrong’ (to a much
larger extent than they would make other errors in recall).
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited online among US users of the Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk at a compensation of one US dollar. There
were 40 participants (30% female) with age ranging from 18 to
58 years (M = 32 years, SD = 12 years).
Materials, design and procedure
A stimulus set from the proscriptive domain was obtained by
adapting 16 socially undesirable behaviors from a previous survey
of injunctive and descriptive norms (Brauer & Chaurand, 2010).
The survey consisted of three parts. The ﬁrst part ostensibly
presented an excerpt from a guidebook to some unknown country.
Participants were told that the task was to guess which country the
excerpted guidebook was describing and therefore encouraged to
read the excerpt carefully. The excerpt consisted of the list of 16
behaviors, four of which were described as ‘uncommon’, and
equally many described as ‘common’, ‘OK’, or ‘wrong’ (counterbal-
anced across different versions). For example, one item read: It iss between descriptive and injunctive norms. Organizational Behavior and
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on the person behind.
After guessing on a country, participants were asked to write a
short essay about their general experiences with guidebooks. This
served as a distracter task before the subsequent recognition task,
in which participants were presented with a list of 27 behaviors.
This list included all of the 16 original behaviors, reordered and
interlaced with 11 new behaviors from the same domain. For each
behavior, participants were asked a multiple-choice question
about how the behavior had been presented in the ﬁrst part: as
common, uncommon, OK, wrong, or not mentioned at all.
Coding
In the recognition task, all incorrect responses were coded as
belonging to one of four categories of error: opposite (mixing up
‘common’ with ‘uncommon’ or ‘OK with ‘wrong), congruent (mix-
ing up ‘common’ with ‘OK or ‘uncommon’ with ‘wrong’), incongru-
ent (mixing up ‘common’ with ‘wrong’ or ‘uncommon’ with ‘OK’),
and no recall (if the response was ‘not mentioned’ or if no response
option was chosen at all).
Results
Results from the recognition task are presented in Table 2. On
average, participants correctly recalled slightly less than half of
all presented norms: 44% of presented descriptive norms and
47% of presented injunctive norms. Our interest lies in when recall
was incorrect. Ignoring the cases when there was no recall at all,
we consider three categories of error (opposite, congruent, incon-
gruent). If error in recall was the result of chance responses these
categories of error should be equally common. Instead, as pre-
dicted, congruent errors dominated, see Table 2.
We conducted an ANOVA of the number of norm recall errors
with type of presented norm (2 levels: descriptive or injunctive)
and error category (3 levels) as within-subject factors. This analysis
conﬁrmed that the observed difference between error categories
was highly unlikely to occur by chance, F(2,78) = 32.4, p < .001.
The type of presented norm had no statistically signiﬁcant main
effect, nor did norm type interact with error category, all ps > .5.
Discussion
In this study we found a strong pattern in errors made in recall
of information about norms: Errors were dominated by incorrectly
recalling a norm as the congruent norm of the different type (such
as recalling ‘common’ as ‘OK’ or vice versa). Thus, participants
tended to mix up descriptive and injunctive concepts as predicted
by the earlier established association between commonness and
morality. The independence of norm type implies a bi-directional
effect on memory of the common–moral association, consistent
with the ﬁndings of Study 4.
Study 6
The previous study showed a strong bias for congruence in
errors in recall of norm information in the proscriptive domain.Table 2
Study 5 average numbers of descriptive and injunctive items in each of several recall cate
Presented norm Correct recall Opposite recall Congr
Descriptive 3.48 ± 0.34 0.70 ± 0.16 1.77 ±
Injunctive 3.75 ± 0.35 0.50 ± 0.16 1.98 ±
Note: Every participant gave a total of 16 responses about their recall of 8 items presenti
categorized as either opposite (e.g., ‘common’ recalled as ‘uncommon’), congruent (e.g., ‘c
give mean ± se for the number of participants’ responses that belonged to each category
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tive domain. It also added one methodological feature, based on
the notion that congruent recall errors are not complete memory
failures but rather successful recall of an associated norm. Thus,
the dominance of congruent errors should be pronounced among
responses where complete memory failure can be ruled out. In
order to test this prediction, a task asking for free-recall of the list
of behaviors was included before the recognition task. The purpose
of the free-recall task was to establish a set of behaviors that were
deﬁnitely recalled, for which complete memory failure could be
ruled out. We predicted the bias for congruence in errors in the
subsequent recognition task to be particularly strong in responses
where complete memory failure could be ruled out.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited online among US users of the Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk at a compensation of one US dollar. There
were 40 participants (38% female) with age ranging from 18 to
59 years (M = 30 years, SD = 11 years).
Materials, design and procedure
See the online Supplementary material for complete instruc-
tions to Study 6. The material in Study 5 was adapted to the pre-
scriptive domain, with 16 socially desirable behaviors adapted
from the Moralism scale (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). For example,
one item in the ‘‘excerpted guidebook’’ read [It is common/It is
uncommon/You are obligated/You are not obligated] to keep your gar-
den looking proper and well-kept. The norm labels (common,
uncommon, obligated, not obligated) were distributed and coun-
terbalanced in the same way as in Study 5.
The same recognition task as in Study 5 was here preceded by a
free-recall task. As mentioned above, its purpose was to identify
responses for which complete memory failure could be ruled out.
Participants were cued to recall as many as possible of the behav-
iors presented in the guidebook excerpt. In order not to interfere
with the subsequent recognition task, participants were here told
not to bother with recalling the norms but only the behaviors.
Coding
In the free-recall task, each itemwas binary coded as either suc-
cessfully recalled (1) or not (0). The coder was unaware of the
hypothesis. As a reliability test, a second coder recoded 25% of
the data; codings were 98% identical.
Responses to the recognition task were coded in analogy with
Study 5. For instance, congruent errors were those mixing up ‘com-
mon’ with ‘obligated’ or ‘uncommon’ with ‘not obligated’.
Results
Results in the recognition task are presented in Table 3. First
note that, on average, participants correctly recalled slightly more
than half of all presented norms: 52% of presented descriptive
norms and 58% of presented injunctive norms. Consistent with
our aim to identify responses for which complete memory failuregories.
uent recall Incongruent recall No recall Total
0.24 0.93 ± 0.19 1.13 ± 0.16 8
0.25 0.70 ± 0.15 1.08 ± 0.18 8
ng descriptive norms and 8 items presenting injunctive norms. Incorrect recall was
ommon’ recalled as ‘OK’), or incongruent (e.g., ‘common’ recalled as ‘wrong’). Entries
.
s between descriptive and injunctive norms. Organizational Behavior and
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Table 3
Study 6 average numbers of descriptive and injunctive items in each of several recall categories.
Presented norm Preceding free-recall Correct recall Opposite recall Congruent recall Incongruent recall No recall Total
Descriptive Not successful 3.05 ± 0.29 0.50 ± 0.17 1.68 ± 0.23 0.28 ± 0.09 0.75 ± 0.13 6.25 ± 0.26
Successful 1.15 ± 0.24 0 0.50 ± 0.11 0.05 ± 0.05 0.05 ± 0.03 1.75 ± 0.26
Total 4.20 ± 0.32 0.50 ± 0.17 2.17 ± 0.27 0.32 ± 0.10 0.80 ± 0.13 8
Injunctive Not successful 3.63 ± 0.35 0.30 ± 0.11 1.25 ± 0.23 0.48 ± 0.12 0.80 ± 0.17 6.45 ± 0.20
Successful 1.05 ± 0.16 0.08 ± 0.04 0.35 ± 0.14 0.05 ± 0.03 0.03 ± 0.02 1.55 ± 0.20
Total 4.68 ± 0.37 0.38 ± 0.13 1.60 ± 0.29 0.52 ± 0.13 0.83 ± 0.18 8
Note: Every participant gave a total of 16 responses about their recall of 8 items presenting descriptive norms and 8 items presenting injunctive norms. For each participant
these items were further split into two classes based on whether the participant had successfully recalled the presented behavior in a preceding free-recall task. Incorrect
recall was categorized as either opposite (e.g., ‘common’ recalled as ‘uncommon’), congruent (e.g., ‘common’ recalled as ‘obligated’), or incongruent (e.g., ‘common’ recalled as
‘not obligated’). Entries give mean ± se for the number of participants’ responses that belonged to each category.
8 Some examples of items: to give money to beggars in need; never slapping one’s
child; to take only half of some goodies you have purchased to share with a friend.
8 K. Eriksson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxxcan be ruled out, correct recall was especially high (66% for
descriptive norms and 69% for injunctive norms) for those items
where participants had previously succeeded in recalling the pre-
sented behavior in the free-recall task.
When descriptive norms were presented, the congruent error
category was more than 4 times as large as any of the other two
error categories – and at least 10 times as large when looking only
at those items where participants had previously succeeded in
recalling the presented behavior. For injunctive norms, the congru-
ent error category was more than 3 times larger than any of the
other categories – and more than 4 times larger when looking only
at successfully free-recalled items.
We conducted an ANOVA of the number of norm recall errors
with type of presented norm (2 levels: descriptive or injunctive),
error category (3 levels) and behavior recall success (2 levels: suc-
cessful or not) as within-subject factors. This analysis revealed that
the observed difference between error categories was highly unli-
kely to occur by chance, F(2,78) = 49.1, p < .001, and similarly for
the interaction between category and behavior recall success,
F(2,78) = 13.0, p < .001. The type of the presented norm had no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant main effect or interaction with any other fac-
tor, all ps > .20.
Discussion
This study replicated Study 5 using stimuli from the prescrip-
tive domain. As in the previous study, the dominating recall error
was to recall a norm as the congruent norm of the different type
(such as recalling ‘common’ as ‘obligated’ or vice versa). As in Stud-
ies 4 and 5, the effect was bi-directional.
The present study also included a free-recall task of the behav-
iors used as stimuli. Consistent with the bias for congruent errors
reﬂecting successful recall of associated norms, the bias was partic-
ularly strong among responses to items that were successfully
free-recalled.
Study 7
The ﬁnal two studies focused on whether perceptions of com-
monness inﬂuence own moral judgments of speciﬁc behaviors. In
the proscriptive domain this is already supported by several stud-
ies: Own moral judgments of an undesirable behavior tend to be
less harsh when the behavior was thought to be common
(McGraw, 1985; Traﬁmow et al., 2001; Welch et al., 2005). For this
reason, our studies focused on the prescriptive domain instead. As
discussed in the introduction, it has previously been predicted that
higher moral status would be attributed to uncommon behaviors
than to common behaviors (McGraw, 1985; Reeder & Brewer,
1979). The common–moral association hypothesis makes the
opposite prediction. We tested these competing predictions in aPlease cite this article in press as: Eriksson, K., et al. Bidirectional association
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descriptive norms in a foreign group before making own moral
judgments of these behaviors. The study was conducted in two
versions, differing in whether judgments were of the moral obliga-
tion to behave in a certain way or of themoral character of a person
who behaves in that way. The purpose of this was to establish
whether these different aspects of morality are inﬂuenced by com-
monness in the same way.
Method
Participants
The moral obligation version of the study was completed by 116
unique participants (37% female) with age ranging from 19 to
82 years (M = 34 years, SD = 12 years) recruited online among
American users of Mturk at a compensation of 0.75 US dollar.
The moral character version of the study run at a later date and
was completed by 113 unique participants (36% female) with age
ranging from 19 to 66 years (M = 31 years, SD = 10 years), recruited
in the same way.
Materials
Participants were told they were taking part in a study of the
moral status of various behaviors in different countries. We used
nine behaviors adapted from the set of stimuli used in Study 3.
All these behaviors could be judged as morally prescribed depend-
ing on what moral foundations one relies on (Graham et al., 2009).8
For each behavior, participants were presented with the ostensible
descriptive norm in a foreign group. Descriptive norms were manip-
ulated across behaviors and across different versions of the survey,
such that each behavior was presented equally often as ‘‘uncom-
mon’’, ‘‘neither common nor uncommon’’, and ‘‘common’’. In the
moral obligation version, participants were then asked for their
own judgment of the moral obligation of the behavior, on a scale
from 0 = absolutely not morally obligated to 100 = absolutely mor-
ally obligated. In the moral character version, participants were then
asked for their own judgment of the moral character of someone
who behaves in the speciﬁed way, on a scale from 0 = absolutely
not moral to 100 = absolutely moral.
Results
Moral obligations
Mean ratings of moral obligations varied across behaviors from
17.5 to 62.5. For each behavior we normalized ratings by subtract-
ing the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. For each par-
ticipant we calculated three averages of normalized ratings. Ass between descriptive and injunctive norms. Organizational Behavior and
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behaviors presented as ‘‘uncommon’’ (M = 0.13, SD = 0.62) than
for behaviors presented as ‘‘common’’ (M = 0.11, SD = 0.70),
t(115) = 3.28, p = .001, d = 0.30. Consistent with a monotonous
effect, ratings of behaviors presented as ‘‘neither common nor
uncommon’’ had an intermediate level (M = 0.01, SD = 0.58). A
repeated measures ANOVA with three levels of commonness labels
indicated a signiﬁcant effect on ratings of moral obligations,
F(2,114) = 5.56, p = .005, gp2 = 0.089.Moral character
Mean ratings of moral character varied across behaviors from
26.4 to 87.8. Ratings were normalized and averaged as described
above. Results were similar to the moral obligation version. Nor-
malized moral character ratings were lower for behaviors pre-
sented as ‘‘uncommon’’ (M = 0.06, SD = 0.55) than for behaviors
presented as ‘‘common’’ (M = 0.13, SD = 0.73), t(112) = 2.66,
p = .009, d = 0.25. Ratings of behaviors presented as ‘‘neither com-
mon nor uncommon’’ had an intermediate level (M = 0.04,
SD = 0.64). A repeated measures ANOVA with three levels of com-
monness labels indicated a signiﬁcant effect on ratings of moral
character, F(2,111) = 3.86, p = .024, gp2 = 0.065.Discussion
Recall that Study 2 presented a society’s descriptive norms for
some generic behaviors and found these lead to explicit expecta-
tions about the injunctive norms in that society (and vice versa).
Study 7 differed in two important respects, showing that informa-
tion about another society’s descriptive norms for various speciﬁc
behaviors inﬂuence participants own judgments of the moral obli-
gation of these behaviors and of the moral character of someone
who behaves in these ways.
Our ﬁndings are as predicted from the common–moral associa-
tion hypothesis. It is noteworthy that they are in conﬂict with a
theory from the literature on moral trait attribution, according to
which moral attributions should be more extreme for uncommon
behaviors (McGraw, 1985; Reeder & Brewer, 1979). In the prescrip-
tive domain, higher moral status should be attributed to uncom-
mon behaviors according to this theory. On the contrary, we
found a positive effect of commonness on moral attributions (as
well as on judgments of moral obligations).Study 8
Study 7 investigated how moral judgments of well-known
behaviors were inﬂuenced by priming participants with informa-
tion about descriptive norms in a foreign group. To complement
that study, we primed participants with information about their
own group’s typical behavior in a novel situation, the economic
game known as the dictator game. Previous research on the dictator
game has shown that participants tend to adapt their behavior to
descriptive norms presented to them (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009).
The common–moral association hypothesis predicts that also
moral judgments of dictator game behavior will be sensitive to
descriptive norm information.Method
Participants
Two hundred participants (33% female) with age ranging from
18 to 75 years (M = 31 years, SD = 12 years) were recruited online
among American users of Mturk at a compensation of 0.30 US
dollar.Please cite this article in press as: Eriksson, K., et al. Bidirectional association
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Participants were presented with two scenarios describing eco-
nomic game experiments that we had ostensibly run in our lab. An
initial scenario, identical for all participants, presented an invest-
ment game (details available on request). The real experiment
was the second scenario, in which information about typical
behavior was manipulated between subjects. The scenario read
as follows:
‘‘Two participants, anonymous to each other, are in different
rooms in the lab. The experimenter gives 20 dollars to one of the
participants with the following instructions: ‘You have two
options. Either (a) you keep this money (20 dollars), or (b) you give
it back to me, in which case I’ll give you 5 dollars instead and I’ll
give 15 dollars to the other participant (who will otherwise get
nothing).’ When we ran this experiment, about 10 [90] percent
chose to give the money back (i.e., take 5 dollars instead of 20 dol-
lars, so that the other participant would get 15 dollars). Thus,
about 90 [10] percent chose to keep the 20 dollars (so that the
other participant got nothing). In the present survey we are inter-
ested in your thoughts about the moral norms in this situation.
How strong is the moral obligation to give the money back, as
about 10 [90] percent did (and 90 [10] percent did not do)?’’
Half of the participants received the information that giving
back the money was uncommon (namely, that about 10% did it),
the other half received the information that it was common
(namely, that about 90% did it). The moral obligation to give back
the money was estimated on a four-step Likert type scale anchored
in 0 = no obligation at all and 3 = very strong obligation. Note that by
asking about the obligation to give back the money we emphasized
the prescriptive aspect of morality.
Results
As predicted, moral judgments of the obligation to give money
in the dictator game tended to be stricter in the condition where
giving was said to be common (rating 0: 34%, 1: 27%, 2: 23%, 3:
16%) than in the condition where giving was said to be uncommon
(rating 41%, 1: 37%, 2: 17%, 3: 5%). The effect was small but statis-
tically signiﬁcant according to the Mann-Whitney U test, mean
ranks 109.03 vs. 91.97, p = .028, r = 0.15.
Discussion
In this study we found a tendency for judgments of the moral
obligation to give in the dictator game to be sensitive to informa-
tion about how most people behave in the game. This indicates
that commonness inﬂuences own moral judgments in a novel
situation.General discussion
A key feature of all human societies is that behavior is governed
by social norms to some extent. In this paper we have addressed a
fundamental question about the cognition of social norms: Is infor-
mation about descriptive and injunctive norms processed sepa-
rately? Based on the typical co-occurrence of descriptive and
injunctive norms in real life we proposed the common–moral asso-
ciation hypothesis, according to which commonness and morality
should tend to be automatically associated. This hypothesis, as
well as various implications of it, was supported in a number of
experiments. A strong association was found using implicit as well
as explicit measures (Studies 1–2). In memory experiments we
found a systematic tendency for injunctive and descriptive infor-
mation to be mixed up in recall (Studies 3–6). Finally, priming par-
ticipants with descriptive information about speciﬁc behaviorss between descriptive and injunctive norms. Organizational Behavior and
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Taken together, these studies establish the existence of an interest-
ing psychological phenomenon. They also open up several lines of
inquiry for the future.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with the social intuitionist thesis
that moral judgments largely rely on automatic evaluations, in
addition to rational thought and principles learnt from moral
authorities, etc. (Haidt, 2001, 2007). The existence of several
sources of moral judgments suggests future research on modera-
tors of the inﬂuence of the common–moral association. Following
the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) we should
expect this inﬂuence to be moderated by the extent to which a per-
son’s morality has other important sources (such as rational
thought or religious authorities). We should also expect the inﬂu-
ence to vary across different behaviors (Traﬁmow et al., 2001). Fol-
lowing the APE model we should expect the inﬂuence of the
common–moral association to be greatest for behaviors to which
no other beliefs about morality strongly apply.
The latter point suggests the theoretical possibility that the
common–moral association can contribute to the emergence of
new injunctive norms. Assuming that automatic common–moral
associations are common in a population (as Study 1 indicated),
the same injunctive inferences from commonness of behaviors
may be made by many individuals in the group. These mass infer-
ences could potentially aggregate into a new injunctive norm
shared by the group. In other words, for a behavior that was previ-
ously not morally loaded, a group might start thinking of it as mor-
ally obligated if it is common, or as morally suspect if it is
uncommon. A related argument was made already by Kelley
(1971). Nonetheless, this prediction remains to be tested.
Obviously, all common behaviors do not become morally obli-
gated. One reason for this, we speculate, is that a behavior may
have to reach a high degree of commonness for the common–
moral association to be activated. This is consistent with research
on conformity where perceived consensus has been found to play
an important role (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Thus, it is typically
not sufﬁcient that a behavior is in moderate majority for sponta-
neous conformity to be elicited (Claidière & Whiten, 2012;
Eriksson & Coultas, 2009). The effects of different degrees of com-
monness on the common–moral association should be similarly
investigated.
Once norms are established, for whatever reason, the com-
mon–moral association would also potentially play a role in sus-
taining norms. For example, consider societies where corruption
is endemic. It is notoriously difﬁcult to eradicate corruption in
such societies (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). One reason
might be that when most people are corrupt, anti-corruption
campaigns that highlight this fact will be in vain because the
automatic association will be that corrupt behavior is not so
wrong after all.
In sum, all studies in this paper were focused on establishing
the common–moral association at the individual level. Future
research on the common–moral association should investigate
(a) moderators of its effects on individual moral judgments and
(b) its potential to cause emergence of shared injunctive norms
in groups and maintenance of norms when the group faces
norm-conﬂicting information.
Finally, note that our memory experiments used a novel para-
digm for recall errors related to automatic associations. This para-
digm could be applied to the study of other associations than the
common–moral association.
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